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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMINENT DOMAIN - EXTENSION OF FIFTH Al\mND·
MENT "TAKING" To INCLUDE DESTRUCTION OF LIEN RIGHT BY THE DOCTRINE
OF IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FROM ATIACHMENT- Upon default
of the contracting shipbuilder, the United States acquired title to certain
materials in accordance with a contract provision. Petitioners, who had
previously acquired materialmen's liens on these materials, claimed that
assertion of the doctrine of immunity of government property from attachment resulted in a "taking" of their liens in violation of the fifth amendment. This was rejected by the Court of Claims.1 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three Justices dissenting.2
Since the builder had title at the time the materials were furnished, the
property was not a "public work" and thus the liens attached. The right
to resort to specific property for the satisfaction of a debt is a compensable
property interest and its destruction constitutes a "taking" within meaning
of the fifth amendment.3 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
In its first consideration of the fifth amendment "taking" clause,4 the
Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases5 held that "taking" referred
"only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting
from the exercise of a lawful power."6 Under the "consequential injuries"
limitation compensation is not required where the property damage is an
incidental result of the exercise of an ordinary governmental power7 or

1 Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959). The Court reasoned
that since these boats were being built under contract with the United States, they were
a "public work" immune from materialmen's liens; therefore the liens never attached and
no property of petitioners was taken.
2 Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Clark. The dissent argued that "the very nature
of the [governmental immunity] doctrine ..• precludes regarding its interposition as a
Fifth Amendment 'taking.' " Principal case at 50.
3 Principal case at 48. In addition to the expansion of the "taking" concept, the
Court also held that the mere prospect that property will later be owned by the United
States does not make it a "public work" immune from materialmen's liens and that a
lien-holder's right to resort to specific property for satisfaction of a debt was a compensable property interest. The latter is an extension of a 1935 decision holding that the
right to resort to specific land was a compensable property interest. See Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.''
5 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
6Jd. at 551.
7 Kauper, Basic Principles of Eminent Domain, 35 Mich. S.B.J., Oct. 1956, p. 10, 18.
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where remote and incidental damage results from a compensable "taking."8
The scope of this limitation was, however, restricted by United States v.
Causby 0 where the repeated landing and taking off of war planes with a
glide path extremely close to private property was held to constitute a
"taking" of an easement over the land. Arguably, under the Legal Tender
test this was merely an incidental injury resulting from the lawful exercise
of the war power. But in Causby the governmental action involved direct
interference with the use and enjoyment of the property in contrast to the
regulatory scheme present in the Legal Tender Cases. The traditional tort
remedy for trespass or nuisance would have been available to Causby but
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is likely that the Court limited
the scope of the "consequential injury" limitation in order to give to plaintiff some form of relief, for although the federal government had waived its
immunity regarding constitutional claims, it had not done so regarding
tort claims.1° Similarly, in the principal case, the petitioners' loss of security
rights seems to be an incidental result of the exercise of the federal government's power to contract. However, since the doctrine of immunity of
governmental property from attachment prevents the assertion of petitioners' security interest in specific property, the principal case, by substituting
fifth amendment relief for a traditional remedy here unavailable because of
governmental immunity, presents no substantial departure from the rationale of Causby.
Another limitation on recovery under the fifth amendment is illustrated
by Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States11 where the government requisitioned a steel manufacturer's total output thereby preventing performance
of petitioner's contract for steel. The Court held that a property owner
is entitled to compensation when his property interest is used by the government for a public purpose but not when the property interest is merely
destroyed.12 In practice this distinction has become quite tenuous. For
example, compensation was required for land flooded by governmental
navigation improvements13 but not for a bridge destroyed by rising water
resulting from similar improvements.14Although compensation was required
when the government took over a ship construction contract under which
s Comment, Consequential Damages and "Just Compensation" in Federal Condemnations, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 349 (1951); Comment, Consequential Damages in Federal Condemnation, 35 VA. L. REv. 1059 (1949).
9 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
10 Provision was made for claims based upon the Constitution by 24 Stat. 505 (1887),
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). Provision was made for torts claims by 60 Stat. 842
(1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1958).
11261 U.S. 502 (1923).
12 Accord, United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), where the
Court held that compensation was not required for property destroyed to keep it from
falling into enemy hands.
13 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
14 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
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performance had commenced but final delivery had not occurred,15 no
compensation was required in the Omnia case. While the critical language
of the fifth amendment - "taken for public use" - would not appear to
compel compensation where there is destruction without present or future
governmental use, the distinction is less persuasively applied when, as in
the principal case, the government not only effectively destroys a property
interest but also takes possession of the property in which the interest existed.
To deny recovery because the security interest had not been perfected into
a possessory right would ignore the well-established doctrine that although
the security interest does not represent the totality of rights norm.ally associated with property ownership, a lien is an interest in specific property.1 6
In contrast to the principal case, in Omnia the government never used the
contract rights which constituted the petitioner's only property interest in
issue.1 7 Thus even under the Omnia test the governmental action in the
principal case could reasonably have been considered a "taking" of property for public use. Nevertheless, the result in the principal case is reached
by the majority of the Court under a much broader analysis of the problem.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, discussed the elements of a
fifth amendment "taking" present in the principal case. He found controlling here the elimination of a compensable property interest which
existed before the governmental action18 and the destruction of the value
of liens for a public purpose - action which a private person could not
have done without subjecting himself to suit.1 9 Further, he negatived
certain defenses by noting that neither sovereign immunity nor power to
contract relieves the government of its fifth amendment obligations20 and
observed that the fifth amendment "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 21 While these broad
considerations have a prima facie validity and appeal, all were present in
Omnia and implicity rejected when the Court developed the distinction
between mere destruction and a taking for use.22 Thus, although on its
facts the principal case does not appear to be a major departure from the
prior law, the broad language in the opinion, if not questioned in later
cases, might lead to the demise of the distinction developed in Omnia.
Henry J. Price
15 Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924).
16 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
17 However, it may be argued that

States, 261 U.S. 502 (192!1).
the principal case is very close to Omnia since
both involved "executory" interests which were rendered unenforceable by the federal
government. There seems to be little difference between rendering a contract unenforceable by requisitioning the supplier's total output and rendering a materialmen's lien
unenforceable by taking title to the property in which the lien interest existed.
18 Principal case at 48.
191bid.
20Jd. at 49.
21Ibid.
22 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508.

